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Abstract:  This paper explores the relationship between thinking and acting morally. Can we 
transfer critical thinking skills to real life situations? Philosophical practice with clients as well as 
with school children creates a context for not only being a critical and reflective thinker but also a 
self-critical thinker and self-reflective thinker. In his book On Dialogue, David Bohm explores the 
notion of proprioception of thinking; focusing on thinking as a movement. The tacit, concrete 
process of thinking informs our actions in a way that rational thinking by itself cannot. We can try 
to impose rational thinking on our tacit, concrete process of thinking but knowing how to be just 
abstractly, for example, does not necessarily make us act justly in the moment. Philosophical 
practice puts us in touch with our own tacit, concrete process of thinking. Through dialogue (Bohm, 
Buber) we become more than skilled rational thinkers; we become skilled thinking beings.   
Key Words: Philosophy, Philosophy with Children, Moral Development, Proprioception, Tacit, 
Concrete Knowledge.
 
ou are, it reveals who you  
First Lady Michelle Obama at the Democratic National Convention (08/4/2012) 
 
reveals who you are, revealing of 
moral character (or lack thereof). There is truth to her observation that moral character reveals 
itself under certain circumstances. The question is where moral character resides before it is 
revealed?   
Here I want to refer back to what I heard from my mother whose family survived a 3-year 
Japanese concentration camp during WWII. She was in the camps from age 13  16. One of the 
things she saw and remembered was how being in the camps revealed who people were. Some, 
who under normal circumstances, were upright citizens, kind and empathic showed themselves 
 
F 
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Many in the field of doing philosophy with children believe that doing philosophy with 
children develops moral and ethical behavior as well as good critical thinking skills. The question 
is how.  
I have written a number of articles referencing David Bohm and his work on dialogue. 
He talks specifically about the difference between the rational mind and the mind of 
concrete knowledge  Put simply, while the rational mind (explicit 
knowledge) may be able to explain how to ride a bike, tacit, concrete knowledge will reveal 
whether one can actually ride a bike or not. Our tacit concrete knowledge is often the source of 
our decision-making in terms of how we act or react at any given moment without our being 
explicitly aware of it.   
My contention is that it is our tacit, concrete knowledge, which also reveals our moral 
character or lack thereof. 
Much of our enculturation is learned unconsciously, through osmosis, we might say. We 
simply absorb the cultural values we grow up with. Enculturation exists on the level of tacit, 
concrete knowledge, and informs our conscious, explicit knowledge in a way we are not aware of. 
Gloria Wekker refers s a 
which is in between our ears, in our hear 1 
people have been socialized into, that becomes natural, escaping c 2 It is for these 
reasons misleading to think that philosophical inquiry, as practiced in philosophical counseling as 
well as doing philosophy with children, would somehow be free from these same societal 
 
From the perspective of the dominant political system, for example, racism is considered 
creating a notion of ommon sense. 3  It is simply the norm. 
, perspectives that 
challenge and disagree with what has been taken 
   
Darren Chetty, a doctoral candidate at University College, London has written extensively 
on philosophy, education, and racism. In his work on doing philosophy with children, Chetty 
shows how philosophical inquiry with children itself is not immune from 
.4  So how do we examine and challenge these dominant 
  
In other words, we can rationally agree that racism is wrong, but it continues to underlie 
our societal and cultural norms and values. Systemic racism is pervasive in all our institutions and 
 So how do we become aware of these unconscious 
societal influences?   




Bohm lie at the heart of our collective tacit, concrete knowledge. For this reason, he sates: 
l the pressures that lie behind our 
assumptions. It goes into the process of thought behind the assumptions, and not 
5     
From the perspective of 
the that underlies rational thinking and 
This collectively shared meaning, Bohm states, is very powerful.   
the explicit communication and the body language and all of that, which are part of 
it, but there is also a deeper tacit process 6 
proposing that thought is actually a subtle tacit process. The concrete process 
of thinking is very tacit. The meaning is basically tacit [unspoken]. And what we say 
explicitly is only a very small 7 
 
thought is emerging from the tacit ground, and any fundamental 
change in thought will c 8 (My emphasis).  
According to Bohm, thought can become aware of itself through proprioception, which 
is -perception. 9   Through proprioception the body can perceive itself; it can 
perceive its own movement. Bohm argues that if we conceive of thinking also as a process or 
-
that we can develop the proprioception of thinking. 
It is my contention that we can also become aware of our moral thinking as a process or 
-
develop moral proprioception. 
Only through dialogue, Bohm states, can we begin to uncover the tacit ground which 
informs our (moral) thinking Where we are not obliged 
to do anything, nor to come to any conclusions, not to say anything or not say an
10  
I believe philosophical practice with clients or doing philosophy with children provides 
mpty space, proprioception of thinking and uncover the tacit 
holds our common meaning and history of our norms and values. We need to 
understood. 
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If we do not examine the thought process, the thinking, behind the assumptions and not 
just the assumptions themselves, as Bohm explains, we cannot truly bring about a real change of 
thought. In other words, we can change our thinking on the level of explicit thought, or rational 
thought, but if we do not change thought on the level of tacit, concrete thought, no real change 
can occur. 
Rational thought and the idea that we ought to be just and fair in our interactions with 
people in itself will not lead us act justly and fairly in the moment. 
It is ea
intentioned. But who are we when put to the test and thrown outside of our comfort zone so to 
speak? Who are we then? And can we act solely from a rational imperative, as Kant suggests?   
cognitive dissonance when we rationally convince of ourselves of not being racist but find 
ourselves acting in racist ways when we least expect it?  
W
Central Park encountered a Black man Christian Cooper, a birdwatcher. Her dog was unleashed 
(which was against the law) and when he asked her to leash her dog she refused. When he 
beckoned the dog with a treat, she yelled at him to not touch her dog and placed a 9-1-1 call 
explaining to the police that an African-American man was threatening her life. 
For all intents and purposes, Amy Cooper is not a racist per se, but in this particular 
help her gain ground and threaten Christian Cooper. 
Had Christian Cooper been a white man this tactic would not have worked. She may have 
told the police that a man was threatening her life, but saying that a white man was threatening 
her life would not appeal to the tacit, collective shared meaning of what it means to be Black in the 
US. 
The question is how to make any fundamental change in society, if telling ourselves not 
to be racist on a purely explicit, rational and abstract level has failed to make any fundamental 
changes through the ages from slavery to Jim Crow, to KKK violence, to mass incarceration, police 
brutality and the white-supremacist storming of the Capitol on January the 6th, 2020. Racism may 
take on different forms but continues to exist on a tacit, shared level throughout all levels of 
society.  
I have been involved in philosophical practice and in doing philosophy with children, 
adolescents and adults throughout my career. An 
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1998 dissertation) is where dialogue allows us to problematize the taken for granted and slowly 
uncover (reveal) our tacit, concrete knowledge. 
The gap leads us to a place of uncertainty and puzzlement; a place of aporia. Creating a 
sense of puzzlement essentially creates a space where one has 
which includes our tacit, concrete knowledge.  For example, i
certainty existing on the level of rational thought is categorically undermined.  
I Laches the nature of courage is discussed. At the end of the dialogue, 
we are left with no clear rational (explicit) definition of what courage truly is. In the process, 
however, we develop a deeper understanding at the tacit, concrete level of thought. Aporia 
transforms (explicit) knowing into (tacit, concrete) understanding. 
Aporia bypasses our purely rational thinking and appeals to our tacit, concrete thinking, 
which informs our explicit knowing and questions it.  
Here I would like to present some examples of my work in doing philosophy with 
children. My focus is on presenting children with aporia questions, questions that are puzzling 
and confusing. Aporia questions cannot be answered on the basis of the explicit knowledge they 
learn in school; instead, it brings them to a place where they have to appeal to their own thinking 
and come up with their own answers.    
Children learn by doing, by riding a bike. Making children aware 
knowledge develops proprioceptive knowledge giving them a tool with which they can evaluate 
their rational thinking. They can question reality from a deeper perspective and more 
comprehensive perspective.  
Here are a few examples from my own work with elementary school children (from first 
through fourth grade). 
After reading a picture book to the whole class, we would proceed to discuss the story with 
half the class in a circle on the floor, while the other half was doing deskwork. The discussion 
centered on questions that the story would elicit.   
In a third-grade classroom, we were discussing the notion of fairness after reading Arnold 
Grasshopper on the Road.  In the story, Grasshopper is 
rudely thrown out of the club celebrating morning - after first being made a member because he 
says he too loves morning - when he declares that he also loves afternoon and night.  After a 
collaborative discussion with her peers, one pupil questioned whether it was fair that her mother 
asked her to not only clean her own room but that of her brother as well.  
She may conclude that it is in fact fair for her parents to expect her to clean his room as 
well  based on the values her family has. But she may also question these values on some other 
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by them, but that she has the ability, awareness, if you will, to question these values in the first 
place. This gives her an awareness of her own thinking giving her a sense of empowerment and 
self-esteem as well. 
I  And she may 
well continue to abide with 
contradiction. What it does entail is that there are multiple ways of looking at things and multiple 
ways of considering what makes something fair or not and she now has the power to decide for 
herself.  
Staying on the subject of fairness, one pupil considered that being rude was itself an act of 
not being fair. He applied the notion of fairness not just to whether it was fair or not to oust 
someone from the club but how it was done. This example shows how reasons were not only 
presented to argue for or against allowing someone into the club, but also how they may apply to 
the larger picture of what it means to belong to a club in the first place. Are we entitled to treat 
someone we believe does not belong to our club poorly or even rudely? Is that fair? 
 
and not just the assumptions themselves. 11    
Another example has to do with the idea of will power in Frog and Toad 
Together by Arnold Lobel and whether getting rid of the problem of wanting to eat all the cookies 
and getting sick rather than resisting the temptation of eating all the cookies is really a form of will 
power. One pupil commented that simply getting rid of the problem was fake will power.  When 
the problem is eliminated, the will power it takes to resist is also gone. Real will power consists of 
resisting the temptation of giving in to something in the first place. 
This example shows how the idea of will power is brought into a larger context viewed 
from the perspective of what it really means to have will power - having the ability to actively resist 
a temptation in real life - and not just in a theoretical sense. Some argued persuasively that the 
characters in the story were at least trying to exert will power, by putting the cookies in a box tying 
a string around it and placing it on a high shelf. But in the end, they could only conclude that 
getting rid of the problem by throwing the cookies out to the birds was the only way Frog and 
Toad in the story could deal with the dilemma they were in.  
Another example has to do with the idea of doing something on purpose or not and how 
that does or does not make a difference in Grasshopper on the Road by Arnold 
Lobel. During the discussion, I asked the question whether it makes a difference when someone 
bumps into you on the playground and it was done on purpose or not. Well, surely it does.  And 
surely, we can come up with good reasoning skills to make our point. But one pupil brought the 
issue into a larger context and questioned his/her own responsibility in the situation stating that 
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if the person who was bumped into, was bumped into because he/she had not tied their shoelaces 
which made the person trip and bump into you. In other words, what if you are partly responsible 
for the accident?        
Through these examples, I am trying to show how children are not simply theorizing and 
using good critical thinking skills, which can be checked off on a list of thinking skills. They are 
aware of how what they are discussing also applies to real life and how.  
They are learning to be aware of the much larger framework of tacit, concrete knowing in 
which these questions arise. This gives them the power to question and not just the skill. They are 
empowered to question and think for themselves. In this way, I believe, we can prepare children 
for developing not just their moral thinking skills but provide the context for developing moral 
character as well.  
already primed to understand the larger whole because this is the world they have to grow into. 
They are working out their relationship to the larger whole. We may see their behavior as driven 
by their own needs, but misread their needs as being related solely to themselves and not to how 
they fit in the world they participate in. 
It is my contention that when children know they are in charge of their own thinking they 
develop the moral character and integrity to live in a world that is more just and transparent. 
Becoming skilled decision-makers is one thing, but being able to follow through on those decisions 
in real life situations and becoming skilled thinking beings takes courage and courage builds moral 
character.  
Can doing philosophy with children with a focus on open dialogue enable children to 
develop moral proprioception and moral character involved in true independent questioning, 
thinking, and acting? I believe it can. 
 
Maria daVenza Tillmanns is former President of the American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and 
Psychotherapy (ASPCP), and is currently heading a project in doing philosophy with children in an 
underserved school in San Diego in partnership with the University of California, San Diego. She is the 
author of a book series inspired by her work doing philosophy with children and adults, Why We Are 
in Need of Tails and Why We Are in Need of Tales, part I. Why We Are in Need of Tales, part II, with 
a focus on dreams will appear shortly. 
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